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CaseNo.20110292-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATEOFUTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID Q. POULSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an order of restitution from convictions for 
participating in a pyramid scheme, class B misdemeanors, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6a-4 (West Supp. 2011). This Court has jurisdiction under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).1 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial court correctly ordered Defendant to pay restitution after 
Defendant pleaded guilty to participating in a pyramid scheme. Defendant 
admitted in his plea that he solicited $168,400 from the two victims, and he 
acknowledges on appeal that the victims lost that sum. Unrebutted record 
evidence supports those facts. These facts establish a causal nexus between 
1
 Citation throughout this brief is to the current code, applicable at the 
time of events at issue in this case. 
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Defendant's criminal conduct and the victims's losses because the offense 
Defendant pleaded guilty to uniquely provides an offender's victims with civil 
causes of action to regain their lost consideration. Restitution for those losses is 
appropriate because Utah prohibits and criminalizes even mere participation in 
a pyramid scheme, when the defendant—as here —receives compensation for 
introducing another into the scheme. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court properly order Defendant to pay restitution of 
$60,000 where Defendant admitted soliciting $168,000 from victims and the 
offense of participating in a pyramid scheme provides civil remedies for the 
victim's losses? 
Standard of Review. "[An appellate court] will not disturb a trial court's 
order of restitution unless the trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law 
or abuses its discretion." State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, | 5, 217 P.3d 274 
(brackets in original) (quoting State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332, If 6,170 P.3d 
1141). 
STATUTES 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
2 
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UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-4, -19 (West 2010); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6a-l-4, -6 (West 2004 and West Supp. 2011); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-38a-102, -301, -302 (West 2004 and West 
Supp. 2011). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Defendant was charged with two counts of securities fraud and one count 
of unlicensed broker-dealer. R2-1. Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of 
participating in a pyramid scheme in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-4 
(West Supp. 2011), class B misdemeanors. R7-5; R78:4-6 (Amended Information 
and Judgment attached at Addendum B). As a factual basis for the plea, 
Defendant, through counsel, admitted that on or about "March 14th of 2008 and 
September 26th, 2008, [he] solicited funds for a pyramid scheme, the total 
amount was ... $168,400." R78:5 (Transcript of plea hearing attached at 
Addendum C). The court sentenced Defendant to two 180-day jail terms, 
suspended the sentences, fined Defendant, and placed him on probation for 
twelvemonths. R6-5. 
The State moved for an order requesting Defendant pay restitution to two 
named victim in the amount of $168,400. R17-16 ("motion"). The motion was 
supported by two promissory notes. In one of the notes, dated March 11,2008, 
Defendant ("borrower"), promised to pay Robert Clark ("lender"), "$100,000 
together with interest at the rate of three (3%) per month on the unpaid 
3 
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principal balance from $100,000 until paid in full one year later unless 
renewed/' R13. The other note, dated September 23,2008, was identical to the 
first, except that the lender was Michael Keith, the unpaid principal balance was 
$90,000, and interest to be paid was "forty-eight (48%) per annum/7 R9-8. Each 
note was signed by Defendant and the respective victim/lender. R12,8. Also 
attached to the motion was a summary of these two investments, setting out 
interest payments paid to each victim/lender—$18,000 to Clark and $3,600 to 
Keith-totaling a "loss for restitution" for Clark of $82,00, and for Keith of 
$86,400, for a combined total of $186,400 and photocopies of Clark's check, made 
to "Q & B Capital, LLC of David Poulsen." R14,13. (Motion and supporting 
documents attached at Addendum D.) 
In response, Defendant moved to dismiss the hearing on substantially the 
same grounds he argues on appeal—lack of a factual foundation or a causal 
nexus to show the victims, losses stemmed from his acts. R31-24, 51-41. The 
State opposed Defendant's motion, arguing that (1) restitution was appropriate 
because the victims could recover their losses in a civil action under a variety of 
legal theories and (2) Defendant was responsible for the victims, losses because 
he admitted and pleaded guilty to introducing the victims into the pyramid 
scheme. R40-33, at 37-35. The State also noted that unbeknownst to Clark and 
4 
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Keith, Defendant was to receive 10% interest per month on their investments 
and that in fact, Defendant received $42,000 from Clark's and Keith's 
investments. R39. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the 
restitution for the reasons urged by the State. R55. 
At the restitution hearing, the State drew the court's attention to its 
request for restitution, including the State's summary of victim's losses, totaling 
$168,400 ($82,000 to Clark and $86,000 to Keith) and the other documents in 
support. R79:3-4. (Transcript of restitution hearing attached at Addendum E). 
Defendant stipulated that "the dollar figures that you see there are the amounts 
that victims put into this." Id. at 4. But Defendant then attempted to re-argue 
the previously denied motion not to impose restitution: 
Defense Counsel: I, I reiterate that there has to be a nexus between 
the allegations pled to, which is participating in a pyramid scheme, 
and the restitution in this case. And I don't believe that 168 
represents a nexus in any way, shape or form to, to the injury -
The Judge: That's the argument you made to me that I denied 
though, isn't it? 
Defense Counsel: I'm not sure if that's, if that's what the basis of 
your denial was, Your Honor. I'm not sure 
The Judge: That was the basis - -
Defense Counsel: - - if that's what you said. 
The Judge: -- of your case though, wasn't it? 
5 
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Defense Counsel: My request was to dismiss the hearing. 
The Judge: Yes. 
Defense Counsel: I think the court can still have a hearing but still 
make a decision as to the appropriateness of the relationship 
between the a . . . 
We DON'T concede though those victims lost that at the 
hands of this person. There's no facts in the record to support that, 
Your Honor. Any facts would be hearsay to that effect. 
We pled very simply to participating in a pyramid scheme. I 
asked the court in all earnest that the restitution order be tied to 
only those facts. Otherwise we would not have pled to them, Your 
Honor. 
I would say further, had we known that we were going to be 
facing $168,000 restitution I would rather take, try the case and 
have the offense, you know, dealt with in a full and fair hearing 
that plead to participating in a pyramid scheme and still face a 
$168,000 payback. 
The Judge: Well, if he had been found guilty you would still be 
faced with the same consequence. They would be asking for 
restitution for this amount. 
Defense Counsel: They would be, and then, and again 
The Judge: We would be right here today whether you pled guilty 
or found guilty. 
Defense Counsel: But we'd probably only do it to a pyramid 
scheme, Your Honor. That's different than sticking somebody up 
for [$]168,000. They are not the same. And there's no a nexus 
between those two, it's very very crucial. 
6 
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Id. at 5-6 (capital letters in original; brackets added). 
The court acknowledged Defendant's argument, but declined to accept it. 
Id. at 7. The court reminded Defendant that he had earlier stipulated to the 
amount of $168,000 as "the amount the victims had put into the scheme, but 
neverthless invited counsel to present evidence "as to what the amount ought to 
be." Id. at 7. Defense counsel replied that even though Defendant was making 
$100,000 per year, he would soon be facing the expense of sending one of his six 
children on a Church mission and another to college and had other expenses 
related to a "growing" family. Id. at 7-9. 
The State responded that based on documents Defendant filed two years 
earlier in seeking bankruptcy, his income exceed his expenses by $1,000 per 
month. Id. at 9. Thereafter the following exchanges took place: 
The Judge: Okay. So let's make sure that you're both a [sic], 
representing to me the standard of review for the court here today. 
You both stipulate and agree that the real purpose of the hearing 
today is to determine not the amount of restitution, that's been 
fixed and is full and complete at [$]168,400. Right? But the order 
should be based on his ability to pay. Correct? 
Prosecutor: Yes, Your Honor. 
The Judge: Do you agree with that? 
Defense Counsel: I do agree with that. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Judge: And what you've presented to me is the only evidence 
that I have before me to determine his ability to pay. Correct? 
Defense Counsel: Yes. As well as appropriateness. If I could state 
for the record, as well as the appropriateness of the payment in the 
nexus to the crime is, I believe, a proper standard for the court to 
• follow. "" "•'  * * * * < • -* ' - ^ 
The Judge: I'm not quite sure. You keep arguing that to me and 
I'm not sure I understand it. Because that was before me before 
and I, I think I denied that, that argument that you have made that 
there should be a restitution that, no restitution in this case because 
it's not appropriate to the crime he committed. 
Defense Counsel: And the only thing again I would like to say for 
the record on that point, it's appropriate to have a restitution 
hearing where both the amount of restitution, or both the ability to 
pay as well as the circumstances of the restitution are appropriate. 
I think that that is within the scope of a restitution hearing. 
The Judge: Ms. Baldwin do you have, O'Bryant do you have 
anything to respond to that? 
Prosecutor: Your Honor, I think the court has ruled on whether 
restitution is appropriate in the case. It's just simply the amount 
that needs to be addressed here today. 
Id. at 10-11. 
Defendant suggested that he could pay and it would be reasonable to 
impose "a $10,000 obligation over a period ... of three years." Id. at 8. The court 
ordered that Defendant pay $30,000 in restitution to each of the victims, Clark 
and Keith, at the rate of $500 per month to each victim, that is, $60,000 total paid 
at a rate of $12,000 per year. Id. at 12. See also signed Minutes of Restitution 
8 
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Hearing, R57-56 (attached at Addendum F). The court based its order largely on 
the documented evidence that Defendant had $1,000 in monthly disposable 
income after expenses. Id. at 9,12-13 
"'
 r
 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R60. Thereafter, Defendant 
moved the trial court to stay judgment, including the restitution order, until this 
Court decided his appeal. R70-62. The trial court denied the stay, noting that 
the victims would be prejudiced by any further delay in receiving restitution. 
R77-76. Defendant then moved for a stay in this Court. This Court denied the 
stay, noting that Defendant had failed to show that he would be irreparably 
harmed by paying restitution during the pendency of the appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that in ordering restitution, the trial court did not rely 
on the facts admitted to in the plea hearing, but rather made impermissible 
inferences as to his conduct and its nexus to the victims7 losses. Contrary to this 
argument, Defendant's guilty plea, his admissions, and the undisputed facts 
justify the court's restitution order. 
Defendant pleaded guilty to participating in a pyramid scheme and 
admitted that he solicited funds from both victims in the total amount of 
$168,400. And record evidence, as well as the very existence of the proceedings 
9 
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in this case, support that the victims never recovered their money. The court 
made no inferences beyond these facts, nor did it need to, to justify its 
restitution award of $30,000 to each victim because the Pyramid Scheme Act sets 
out statutory remedies when it is violated, which in turn establish pecuniary 
damages, justifying the court's restitution award. 
Contrary to Defendant's further argument, restitution need not have been 
based on a showing of "some species of common law fraud." Utah, like other 
states, have recognized that pyramid schemes are against public policy and are 
inherently deceptive because the lower ranks of those participating are 
necessarily harmed. 
Finally, Defendant was not denied due process. Contrary to Defendant's 
claim, the trial court gave reasons for awarding restitution, and Defendant 
received all the hearing that he was entitled to. 
10 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING THAT DEFEND ANT PAY RESTITUTION WHERE 
DEFENDANT ADMITTED SOLICITING FUNDS FROM 
VICTIMS AND THE OFFENSE OF PARTICIPATING IN A 
PYRAMID SCHEME PROVIDES CIVIL REMEDIES FOR THE 
• VICTIM'S LOSSES 
Defendant argues that "[i]n entering the restitution order, the trial court 
did not rely upon what was admitted to in the plea hearing, but rather made 
impermissible inferences as to the conduct of the defendant... in relation to the 
victims, and in establishing a causal link to the putative damages." Aplt. Br. at 
4, 4-17. Defendant further argues that he "was ordered to make restitution 
without basic due process considerations in violation of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution" because he was not allowed a 
hearing on the appropriateness of the restitution award. Id. at 4, 17-21. 
Defendant's arguments fail because his guilty plea, record evidence, and 
statutorily-provided causes of action associated with participation in a pyramid 
scheme support the restitution order; he was given an adequate hearing; and 
alternatively, any denial of a hearing was invited or harmless under the 
circumstances. 
11 
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A. The record facts and Defendant's guilty plea to participating in a 
pyramid scheme established a sufficient factual basis for ordering 
restitution. 
A pyramid scheme "means any sales device or plan under which a person 
gives consideration to another person in exchange for compensation or the right 
to receive compensation which is derived primarily from the introduction of 
other persons into the sales device or plan ...." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-2(4) 
(West Supp. 2011). "Any person who participates in a pyramid scheme only by 
receiving compensation for the introduction of other persons into the pyramid 
scheme ... is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-4(2) 
(West Supp. 2011). 
Defendant pleaded guilty to two reduced counts of participating in a 
pyramid scheme, in violation of section 76-6a-4(2), class B misdemeanors. R7-5; 
R78:5-6. As a factual basis for the pleas, Defendant admitted that on or about 
"March 14th of 2008 and September 26th, 2008, [he] solicited funds for a 
pyramid scheme, the total amount was ... $168,400." R78:5 (Transcript of plea 
hearing attached at Addendum C). The State requested restitution of $168,400 
to compensate the victims, Clark and Keith, and supported its request with an 
accounting of the victims' losses, Defendant's and the victims' signed 
promissory notes, and a photocopy of Clark's check to Defendant. R17-8 
(Addendum D). At the restitution hearing, the State drew the court's attention 
12 
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to its previous request for restitution, including its summary of victim's losses — 
set off by any interest the victims7 received —a loss of $82,000 to Clark and 
$86,400 to Keith, and its supporting documents. R79:3-4. (Transcript of 
restitution hearing attached at Addendum E). Defendant stipulated that the 
State's accounting accurately reflected "the amounts that victims put into this"; 
that is, the combined amount of $168,400 was what the victims lost. R78:4. 
Indeed, Defendant admits on appeal, that the victims lost, in total, the amounts 
he stipulated to. See RAplt. Br. at 9,15. 
In sum, Defendant admitted to participating in a pyramid scheme; the 
documents in support of the State's request for restitution establish that the 
victims joined the pyramid by giving Defendant their $186,400; and Defendant 
admits that the victims lost a total of $168,400 in the pyramid scheme. Those are 
the facts, and contrary to Defendant's argument, the trial court made no 
inferences beyond those facts necessary to support its determination of complete 
restitution ($168,400) or court-ordered restitution ($60,000). 
B. The offense of participating in a pyramid scheme uniquely 
provides a causal nexus between the criminal conduct and a 
victim's losses. 
"When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
13 
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this chapter...." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(l) (West Supp. 2011) (emphasis 
added). See State v. haycock, 2009 UT 53 \ 18, 214 P.3d 104) ("[Restitution is 
mandated by statute and is a part of a criminal sanction imposed by the state/7). 
"'Restitution7 means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim[.]77 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(ll) (West 2004). 
"'Pecuniary damages7 means all demonstrable economic injury, ... which a 
person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes ... losses... ,77 UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77~38a-102(6) (West 2004). 
Utah has adopted a modified "but for77 test to determine whether 
pecuniary damages actually arise out of criminal activities. See State v. McBride, 
940 P.2d 539,544 (Utah Ct.App.1997). A modified "but for77 test requires that (1) 
the damages "'would not have occurred but for the conduct underlying the ... 
[defendant's] conviction777 and (2) the "'causal nexus between the [criminal] 
conduct and the loss ... is not too attenuated (either factually or temporally).777 Id. 
at 544 n.5 (citation omitted and brackets added). 
Beneath Defendant's argument that the court made improper inferences 
from the facts lies his more essential claim: "there is no direct causal nexus 
between admitting to participating in [acts involving a pyramid scheme], and 
14 
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third-parties actually losing large sums of money/' Aplt. Br. at 12. To illustrate 
his point, Defendant argues that actors who promoted, as opposed to merely 
participated in, a pyramid scheme, "presumably ... by some species of common 
law fraud/' would be the appropriate subjects of a restitution award. Aplt. Br. 
at 13-15. Nor, he argues, does there exist any "but for"connection between his 
criminal acts and the victims' losses. Aplt. Br. at 15-16. But the statutory 
framework providing for the offense of participating in a pyramid scheme 
expressly rebuts Defendant's argument. 
Chapter 6a of Title 76 sets out the "Pyramid Scheme Act." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-6a-l (West 2004). The Pyramid Scheme Act expressly provides a 
remedy for victims of an offender's receipt of money to participate in a pyramid 
scheme: "Any person giving consideration in connection with a pyramid 
scheme may ... declare his giving of consideration and the related sale or 
contract for sale void, and may bring a court action to recover the consideration/' 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-6(l) (West 2004) (emphasis added). See Peterson v. Tlw 
Sumider Coiy., 2002 UT 43, ^ 39 n.14, 48 P.3d 918 (recognizing in contract 
dispute embracing a putative pyramid scheme remedy provided by section 76-
6a-6(l)). 
15 
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Additionally, a guilty plea under the Pyramid Scheme Act to participating 
in a pyramid scheme automatically subjects a defendant to liability under the 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA") as a matter of law: "A criminal 
conviction under this chapter is prima facie evidence of a violation of Section 13-
11-4, the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act[,]" and further, "[a]ny violation of 
this chapter constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4, the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act/7 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-3(2), -(3) (West Supp. 2011). 
As a result of Defendant's statutory violation of section 13-11-4, his 
victims were entitled to bring an action for their losses under the UCSPA. 
Section 13-11-19 of the UCSPA provides that a "consumer who suffers loss as a 
result of a violation of this chapter may recover, but not in a class action, actual 
damages or $2,000, whichever is greater, plus court costs." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
13-11-19(2) (West 2010). 
As noted, section 77-38a-102(6) provides for recovery of pecuniary 
damages stemming from "facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal 
activities/' "'Criminal activities' means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court ...." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(2) 
(West 2004). The "general rule applicable in criminal proceedings is that by 
16 
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pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential 
elements of the crime charged . . ." State v. Harris, 2011 UT App 274, % 2, 262 
P.3d 1209 (quoting State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989)). 
"
w
 In short, Defendant's guilty plea to participating in a pyramid scheme, his 
admission that he solicited at least $168,400 from the victims, and thie 
undisputed evidence that the victims lost that amount, justified the court's 
ruling that complete restitution should be set at $168,400. And based on thie 
undisputed evidence of Defendant's ability to pay, the court properly ordered 
restitution in the amount of $60,000. 
Contrary to Defendant's argument, that only those committing "some 
species of common law fraud" should be subject to a restitution order, the 
Pyramid Scheme Act, in conjunction with the UCSPA, deems pyramid schemes 
to be inherently deceptive. 
In Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., the Utah Supreme Court considered 
whether a contract providing for a multi-level marketing plan was 
unenforceable because it violated the Pyramid Scheme Act. 2002 UT 43, f^f 28-
41, 48 P.3d 918. Reflecting on the purpose of the Act, the court stated, "[t]he 
plain language of the Act identifies a particular problem: marketing plans in 
which commissions are paid based primarily upon recruitment rather than on 
17 
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sales of products. Id at ^ 32 (citation omitted). "Such plans/' the court 
continued, "are widely considered to be against public policy inasmuch as they 
tend to reward only the top-level participants, encourage participants to buy 
more products than they need or can sell, and leave lower-level participants in a 
saturated market, unable to recoup their initial investment or achieve the 
economic success promised by promoters/7 Id. (citations omitted). 
In People ex rel Fahner v. Walsh, 461 N.E.2d 78 (111. Ct. App. 1984), the 
Illinois court made express what the Sunrider court implied. Walsh involved the 
multi-level marketing of lists of names at a cost of $1,000 to each subsequent 
participant. Id. at 80-81. The remaining defendant in the case was convicted of 
violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and 
ordered to pay restitution on the amount he received from only a limited class of 
participants. Id. On appeal by the State, the Illinois Court of Appeals first 
opined on the nature of such schemes: "Pyramid programs, such as the [one in 
this case], which induce a person to participate on the representation that he or 
she cannot only regain the purchase price, but also reap profits by selling the 
plan to others, are inherently deceptive and contrary to public policy/' Id. at 82 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). The appellate then modified the restitution order to 
include all purchasers of an interest in the pyramid scheme traceable one sold by 
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the defendant and who thereby lost money due to their participation in the plan. 
Id. at 84-85. See also State ex re. Celebrezze v. Howard, 602 N.E.2d 665, 671 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1991) (holding defendant's participation in pyramid scheme violated 
state consumer sales practices act and stating that"scheme is deceptive in itself 
which is why the legislature enacted the law"). 
In pleading guilty to participating in a pyramid scheme, Defendant 
admitted that he solicited "consideration" in "exchange for [the victims'] 
compensation or the right to receive compensation which is derived primarily 
from the introduction of other persons into the sales device or plan." UTAH 
CODE ANN. 76-6a-2(4). The criminal activity Defendant admitted constitutes 
precisely the type of plan found in violation of public policy in Sunrider, 
recognized as per se deceptive in Fahner and Celebrezze, and unambiguously 
prohibited by the Pyramid Scheme Act. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-3(l) (West 
Supp. 2011) ("A person may not -participate in, organize, establish, promote, or 
administer any pyramid scheme") (emphasis added). Finally, the "but for" test is 
satisfied by Defendant's admission in the plea hearing and the firmly 
established facts of the case: If Defendant had not solicited the victims for their 
consideration, they would not have lost $168,400. 
In sum, the trial court properly ordered Defendant to pay restitution. 
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C Defendant was not denied due process where the trial court gave 
reasons for its restitution order and gave Defendant the hearing 
he was entitled to. 
Defendant argues that the trial court violated due process when it ordered 
him to pay restitution without identifying the reasons for its decision and 
without affording him a hearing to explain why he should not be held 
financially responsible to "injured third parties/' Aplt. Br. at 17-20. Contrary to 
this argument, the trial court did identified its reasons for ordering restitution, 
and Defendant arguably waived his statutory right to any further hearing. In 
any case, any error was harmless because Defendant's admissions justified 
restitution and additional testimony could not have altered that decision. 
The trial court identified its reasons for ordering restitution when it 
denied Defendant's motion opposing the State's request for a restitution 
hearing: "For the reasons set forth by the State, and for good cause appearing, 
the motion to dismiss the restitution hearing is hereby denied." R55. As noted, 
the State opposed Defendant's motion to dismiss for a number of legal reasons. 
Among those reasons were that (1) restitution was appropriate because the 
victims could recover their losses in a civil action under a variety of legal 
theories and (2) Defendant was responsible for the victims' losses because he 
admitted and pleaded guilty to introducing the victims into the pyramid 
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scheme. R40-33, at 37-35. At the restitution hearing, the court repeatedly 
referred to its reasons for denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the hearing: 
Defense Counsel: I, I reiterate that there has to be a nexus between 
the allegations pled to, which is participating in a pyramid scheme, 
tnd the restitution in this case. And I don't believe that 168 
represents a nexus in any way, shape or form to, to the injury -
The Judge: That's the argument you made to me that I denied 
though, isn't it? 
Defense Counsel: I'm not sure if that's, if that's what the basis of 
your denial was, Your Honor. I'm not sure 
The Judge: That was the basis 
Defense Counsel: - - if that's what you said. 
The Judge: - - of your case though, wasn't it? 
Defense Counsel: My request was to dismiss the hearing. 
The Judge: Yes. 
R79:5-6. Later, the following colloquy took place when the parties addressed the 
propriety of court-order restitution: 
The Judge: And what you've presented to me is the only evidence 
that I have before me to determine his ability to pay. Correct? 
Defense Counsel: Yes. As well as appropriateness. If I could state 
for the record, as well as the appropriateness of the payment in the 
nexus to the crime is, I believe, a proper standard for the court to 
follow. 
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The Judge: I'm not quite sure. You keep arguing that to me and 
I'm not sure I understand it. Because that was before me before 
and I, I think I denied that, that argument that you have made that 
there should be a restitution that, no restitution in this case because 
it's not appropriate to the crime he committed. 
Defense Counsel: And the only thing again I would like to say for 
the record on that point, it's appropriate to have a restitution 
hearing where both the amount of restitution, or both the ability to 
pay as well as the circumstances of the restitution are appropriate. 
I think that that is within the scope of a restitution hearing. 
The Judge: Ms. Baldwin do you have, O'Bryant do you have 
anything to respond to that? 
Prosecutor: Your Honor, I think the court has ruled on whether 
restitution is appropriate in the case. It's just simply the amount 
that needs to be addressed here today. 
W.atlO-11. 
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In short, the trial court addressed the reasons for finding restitution 
appropriate by rejecting the arguments Defendant made throughout the 
proceedings opposing restitution. 
As for Defendant's claim that he "was denied even a cursory hearing/7 in 
spite of his objection to any hearing, see Aplt. Br. at 17-20, Defendant invited any 
error in the court's refusal to take evidence on the issue. See State v. Geukgeuzian, 
2004 UT 16, 1f 9, 86 P.3d 742 (stating that invited error doctrine arises from 
principle that "'a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial 
when that party led the trial court into committing the error'") (quoting State v. 
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1109 (Utah 1996)). 
The State acknowledges that on appeal its argument justifying 
restitution is based on additional civil grounds than those proposed or adopted 
below. See Aple. Br. at LB. However, it is well settled that an appellate court 
may affirm a judgment "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that 
stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true 
even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by 
appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on 
by the lower court." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, \ 10, 52 P.3d 1158. Here, the 
underlying facts — Defendant's guilty plea and factual statement in support, and 
undisputed facts establishing the victims' losses — are apparent on the record. 
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Here, Defendant actively opposed the State's request for a restitution 
hearing. R31-23,51-41. And while the State requested that the "court... grant 
the victims a restitution hearing/7 see R39, plainly, had the victim testified, 
Defendant would have been afforded the same opportunity. Moreover, 
Defendant never asked to testify at the restitution hearing and never presented 
any evidence — despite the court's invitation to show why the stipulated losses 
were incorrect. Instead, Defendant simply reargued his legal argument which 
had previously been denied. Under these circumstances, Defendant did not put 
the court on notice that an evidentiary hearing was necessary. 
In any case, Defendant was allowed to substantially argue that restitution 
was not appropriate. He argued that there was no nexus between his guilty plea 
and restitution, that he had never conceded that the victims' losses were 
attributable to his actions or supported by record facts, that the circumstances 
did not justify restitution, and that restitution was inappropriate. R79:5-6,10-11. 
Finally, Defendant never produced any facts that would overcome the record 
facts justifying restitution. 
In sum, Defendant received all the due process he was entitled to and any 
error was invited and/or harmless. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted t h i ^ ^ a a y of February, 2012. 
- *• MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTC 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 13-11-4 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
llChapter 11. Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (Refs & Annos) 
•*"§ 13-11-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier 
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction violates 
this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if 
the supplier knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, approval, performance 
characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it has not; 
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular standard, quality, 
grade, style, or model, if it is not; 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or has 
been used to an extent that is materially different from the fact; 
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is available to the consumer for a reason 
that does not exist, including any of the following reasons falsely used in an advertisement: 
(i) "going out of business"; 
(ii) "bankruptcy sale"; 
(iii) "lost our lease"; 
(iv) "building coming down"; 
(v) "forced out of business"; 
(vi) "final days"; 
(vii) "liquidation sale"; 
(viii) "fire sale"; 
(ix) "quitting business"; or 
(x) an expression similar to any of the expressions in Subsections (2)(d)(i) through (ix); 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in accordance with a 
previous representation, if it has not; 
(f) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied in greater quantity than 
the supplier intends; 
(g) indicates that replacement or repair is needed, If it is not; 
(h) indicates that a specific price advantage exists, if it does not; 
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(i) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation the supplier does not 
have; 
(j)(i) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer 
of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other rights, remedies, or obligations, if the 
representation is false; or 
(ii) fails to honor a warranty or a particular warranty term; 
(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other benefit as an inducement 
for entering into a consumer transaction in return for giving the supplier the names of 
prospective consumers or otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other consumer 
transactions, if receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event occurring after the consumer 
enters into the transaction; 
(I) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship the goods or furnish the services 
within the time advertised or otherwise represented or, if no specific time is advertised or 
represented, fails to ship the goods or furnish the services within 30 days, unless within the 
applicable time period the supplier provides the buyer with the option to: 
(i) cancel the sales agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments to the supplier if 
the refund is mailed or delivered to the buyer within 10 business days after the day on which the 
seller receives written notification from the buyer of the buyer's intent to cancel the sales 
agreement and receive the refund; or 
(ii) extend the shipping date to a specific date proposed by the supplier; 
(m) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), fails to furnish a notice meeting the requirements 
of Subsection (3)(a) of the purchaser's right to cancel a direct solicitation sale within three 
business days of the time of purchase if: 
(i) the sale is made other than at the supplier's established place of business pursuant to the 
supplier's personal contact, whether through mail, electronic mail, facsimile transmission, 
telephone, or any other form of direct solicitation; and 
(ii) the sale price exceeds $25; 
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in a pyramid scheme as defined under Title 76, 
Chapter 6a, Pyramid Scheme Act; 
(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed In response to a charitable solicitation will be 
donated or used for a particular purpose or will be donated to or used by a particular 
organization, if the representation is false; 
(p) if a consumer indicates the consumer's intention of making a claim for a motor vehicle repair 
against the consumer's motor vehicle insurance policy: 
(i) commences the repair without first giving the consumer oral and written notice of: 
(A) the total estimated cost of the repair; and 
(B) the total dollar amount the consumer is responsible to pay for the repair, which dollar 
amount may not exceed the applicable deductible or other copay arrangement in the consumer's 
insurance policy; or 
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(ii) requests or collects from a consumer an amount that exceeds the dollar amount a consumer 
was initially told the consumer was responsible to pay as an insurance deductible or other copay 
arrangement for a motor vehicle repair under Subsection (2)(p)(i), even if that amount is less 
than the full amount the motor vehicle insurance policy requires the insured to pay as a 
deductible or other copay arrangement, unless: 
(A) the consumer's insurance company denies that coverage exists for the repair, in which case, 
the full amount of the repair may be charged and collected from the consumer; or 
(B) the consumer misstates, before the repair is commenced, the amount of money the 
insurance policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible or other copay arrangement, in 
which case, the supplier may charge and collect from the consumer an amount that does not 
exceed the amount the insurance policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible or other 
copay arrangement; 
(q) includes in any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a consumer transaction, 
or any addendum to any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a consumer 
transaction, any confession of judgment or any waiver of any of the rights to which a consumer 
is entitled under this chapter; 
(r) charges a consumer for a consumer transaction that has not previously been agreed to by the 
consumer; 
(s) solicits or enters into a consumer transaction with a person who lacks the mental ability to 
comprehend the nature and consequences of: 
(i) the consumer transaction; or 
(ii) the person's ability to benefit from the consumer transaction; 
(t) solicits for the sale of a product or service by providing a consumer with an unsolicited check 
or negotiable instrument the presentment or negotiation of which obligates the consumer to 
purchase a product or service, unless the supplier is: 
(i) a depository institution under Section 7-1-103: 
(ii) an affiliate of a depository institution; or 
(iii) an entity regulated under Title 7, Financial Institutions Act; 
(u) sends an unsolicited mailing to a person that appears to be a billing, statement, or request 
for payment for a product or service the person has not ordered or used, or that implies that the 
mailing requests payment for an ongoing product or service the person has not received or 
requested; 
(v) issues a gift certificate, instrument, or other record in exchange for payment to provide the 
bearer, upon presentation, goods or services in a specified amount without printing in a readable 
manner on the gift certificate, instrument, packaging, or record any expiration date or 
information concerning a fee to be charged and deducted from the balance of the gift certificate, 
instrument, or other record; or 
(w) misrepresents the geographical origin or location of the supplier's business in connection 
with the sale of cut flowers, flower arrangements, or floral products. 
(3)(a) The notice required by Subsection (2)(m) shall: 
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(i) be a conspicuous statement written in dark bold with at least 12 point type on the first page 
of the purchase documentation; and 
(ii) read as follows: "YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO 
MIDNIGHT OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY (or time period reflecting the supplier's cancellation 
policy but not less than three business days) AFTER THE DATE OF THE TRANSACTION OR 
RECEIPT OF THE PRODUCT, WHICHEVER IS LATER". 
(b) A supplier is exempt from the requirements of Subsection (2)(m) if the supplier's cancellation 
policy: 
(i) is communicated to the buyer; and 
(ii) offers greater rights to the buyer than Subsection (2)(m). 
(4)(a) A gift certificate, instrument, or other record that does not print an expiration date in 
accordance with Subsection (2)(v) does not expire. 
(b) A gift certificate, instrument, or other record that does not include printed information 
concerning a fee to be charged and deducted from the balance of the gift certificate, instrument, 
or other record is not subject to the charging and deduction of the fee. 
(c) Subsections (2)(v) and (4)(b) do not apply to a gift certificate, instrument, or other record 
useable at multiple, unaffiliated sellers of goods or services if an expiration date is printed on the 
gift certificate, instrument, or other record. 
Laws 1973, c. 188, § 4; Laws 1983, c. 55, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 58, § 5; Laws 1985, c. 250, § 1; 
Laws 1987, c. 105, § 3; Laws 1995, c. 237, S 1, eff. May 1, 1995: Laws 1998, c. 194, 6 1, eff. 
May 4, 1998: Laws 1999, c. 21, S 8, eff. May 3, 1999: Laws 2001, c. 196, § 1, eff. April 30, 
2001: Laws 2004, c. 55, 5 2, eff. March 15, 2004: Laws 2005, c. 18, S 2, eff. March 8, 2005: 
Laws 2005, c. 27, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005: Laws 2006, c. 115, S 1, eff. May 1, 2006: Laws 2007, c. 
19, 5 1, eff. April 30, 2007: Laws 2008, c. 232, S 1, eff. May 5. 2008: Laws 2010, c. 54, S 1, eff. 
May 11, 2010. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-11-19 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
"HChapter 11. Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act fRefs & Annos^ 
+§ 13-11-19. Actions by consumer 
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an adequate remedy at law, a 
consumer may bring an action to: 
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this chapter; and 
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who has violated, is violating, 
or is likely to violate this chapter. 
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter may recover, but not in 
a class action, actual damages or $2,000, whichever is greater, plus court costs. 
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(3) Whether a consumer seeks or is entitled to recover damages or has an adequate remedy at 
law, he may bring a class action for declaratory judgment, an injunction, and appropriate 
ancillary relief against an act or practice that violates this chapter. 
(4)(a) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter may bring a class 
action for the actual damages caused by an act or practice specified as violating this chapter by a 
rule adopted by the enforcing authority under Subsection 13-11-8(2) before the consumer 
transactions on which the action is based, or declared to violate Section 13-11-4 or 13-11-5 by a 
final judgment of the appropriate court or courts of general jurisdiction and appellate courts of 
this state that was either officially reported or made available for public dissemination under 
Subsection 13-ll-7(l)(c) by the enforcing authority 10 days before the consumer transactions 
on which the action is based, or with respect to a supplier who agreed to it, was prohibited 
specifically by the terms of a consent judgment which became final before the consumer 
transactions on which the action is based. 
(b) If an act or practice that violates this chapter unjustly enriches a supplier and the damages 
can be computed with reasonable certainty, damages recoverable on behalf of consumers who 
cannot be located with due diligence shall be transferred to the state treasurer pursuant to Title 
67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed Property Act. 
(c) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of this chapter 
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably 
adapted to avoid the error, recovery under this section is limited to the amount, if any, in which 
the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation. 
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may award to the 
prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work reasonably performed if: 
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this chapter has brought or 
maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or a supplier has committed an act or practice 
that violates this chapter; and 
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or required by the court to 
be settled under Subsection 13-ll-21(l)(a). 
(6) Except for consent judgment entered before testimony is taken, a final judgment in favor of 
the enforcing authority under Section 13-11-17 is admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts 
on which it is based in later proceedings under this section against the same person or a person 
in privity with him. 
(7) When a judgment under this section becomes final, the prevailing party shall mail a copy to 
the enforcing authority for inclusion in the pubiic file maintained under Subsection 13-11-
7(l)(e). 
(8) An action under this section shall be brought within two years after occurrence of a violation 
of this chapter, or within one year after the termination of proceedings by the enforcing authority 
with respect to a violation of this chapter, whichever is later. When a supplier sues a consumer, 
he may assert as a counterclaim any claim under this chapter arising out of the transaction on 
which suit is brought. 
Laws 1973, c. 188, § 19; Laws 1983, c. 58, § 9; Laws 1993, c. 4, 5 56; Laws 1995, c. 198, 5 3, 
eff. May 1. 1995; Laws 2010, c. 378, 5 200, eff. May 11, 2010. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2010, c. 378, in subsec. (8), substituted "shall" for "must". 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6a-l 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
"llChapter 6A. Pyramid Scheme Act 
* § 76-6a-l. Short title 
This act FFN11 shall be known and may be cited as the "Pyramid Scheme Act." 
Laws 1983, c. 89, § 1. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6a-2 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*1§Chapter 6A. Pyramid Scheme Act 
••§ 76-6a-2. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(l)(a) "Compensation" means money, money bonuses, overrides, prizes, or other real or 
personal property, tangible or intangible. 
(b) "Compensation" does not include payment based on the sale of goods or services to anyone 
purchasing the goods or services for actual personal use or consumption. 
(2) "Consideration" does not include payment for sales demonstration equipment and materials 
furnished at cost for use in making sales and not for resale, or time or effort spent in selling or 
recruiting activities. 
(3) "Person" includes a business trust, estate, trust, joint venture, or any other legal or 
commercial entity. 
(4) "Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or plan under which a person gives consideration 
to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to receive compensation which is 
derived primarily from the introduction of other persons into the sales device or plan rather than 
from the sale of goods, services, or other property. 
Laws 1983, c. 89, § 1; Laws 2006, c. 247, 5 1, eff. May 1. 2006. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6a-3 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
llChapter 6A. Pyramid Scheme Act 
* § 76-6a-3. Schemes prohibited—Violation as deceptive consumer sales practice-
Prosecution of civil violations 
(1) A person may not participate in, organize, establish, promote, or administer any pyramid 
scheme. 
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(2) A criminal conviction under this chapter is prima facie evidence of a violation of Section 13-
11-4, the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
(3) Any violation of this chapter constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4, the Utah Consumer 
Sales Practices Act. 
(4) All civil violations of this chapter shall be investigated and prosecuted as prescribed by the 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
Laws 1983, c. 89, § 1; Laws 2006, c. 247, S 2, eff. Mav 1, 2006. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6a-4 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
llChapter 6A. Pyramid Scheme Act 
""•§ 76-6a-4. Operation as felony—Participation as misdemeanor—Investigation-
Prosecution 
(1) Any person who knowingly organizes, establishes, promotes, or administers a pyramid 
scheme is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Any person who participates in a pyramid scheme only by receiving compensation for the 
introduction of other persons into the pyramid scheme rather than from the sale of goods, 
services, or other property is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) The appropriate county attorney or district attorney has primary responsibility for 
investigating and prosecuting criminal violations of this chapter. 
Laws 1983, c. 89, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 38, § 79: Laws 2006, c. 247, 5 3, eff. Mav 1. 2006. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6a-6 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
llChapter 6A. Pyramid Scheme Act 
••§ 76-6a-6. Rights of persons giving consideration in scheme 
(1) Any person giving consideration in connection with a pyramid scheme may, notwithstanding 
any agreement to the contrary, declare his giving of consideration and the related sale or 
contract for sale void, and may bring a court action to recover the consideration. In the action, 
the court shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff, require the defendant to pay 
to the plaintiff interest as provided in Section 15-1-4, reasonable attorneys' fees, and the costs 
of the action reduced by any compensation paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in connection 
with the pyramid scheme. 
(2) The rights, remedies, and penalties provided in this chapter are independent of and 
supplemental to each other and to any other right, remedy or penalty available in law or equity. 
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to diminish or abrogate any other right, 
remedy or penalty. 
Laws 1983, c. 89, § 1. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-102 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
llChapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
"UPart 1. General Provisions 
•»§ 77~38a-I02. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the condition that a 
defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make restitution to the victim, or 
fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution. 
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(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, 
which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but 
excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant 
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the defendant will 
enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time, 
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that 
he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution 
and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, following 
acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and defendant 
including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any agreement by which 
the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where charges are dismissed without 
a plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including prejudgment interest/the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured 
damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for expenses to a governmental 
entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except that the 
person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate investigative 
action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been commenced, or 
cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages 
as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001: Laws 2003, c. 278, 5 2, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 
2005, c. 96, 5 3, eff. May 2, 2005. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38A-301 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
^iChapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
*HPart 3. Restitution Requirements 
*•§ 77-38a-301. Restitution—Convicted defendant may be required to pay 
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 7, eff. April 30, 2001. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-302 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
"HChapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
"UPart 3. Restitution Requirements 
••§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim 
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether 
restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in 
Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses 
caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution'' means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders 
the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one 
year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, the 
court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any 
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant 
agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a 
conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
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(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to 
physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance 
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury 
to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to theft of or 
damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and were essential 
to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a 
victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the 
court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions 
to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of 
payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution inappropriate. 
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete restitution 
and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of sentencing if 
feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one year after 
sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an order of 
judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, 5 8, eff. April 30, 2001: Laws 2002, c. 35, 5 13, eff. May 6, 2002: Laws 
2002, c. 185, § 51, eff. May 6, 2002: Laws 2003, c. 285, 5 1, eff. May 5, 2003: Laws 2005, c. 
96, 5 5, eff. May 2, 2005. 
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FILED 
JEFFREY R. BUHMAN #7041 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 851-8026 
Fax:(801)851-8051 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID Q. POULSEN 
aka: 
683 South 40 East 
Salem UT 84653 
DOB: 12/16/1969, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 101401180 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
OTN 
JEFFREY R. BUHMAN, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah, accuses the defendant(s) of the 
following crime(s): 
COUNT 1: PYRAMID SCHEMES, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-4, 
in that the above named defendant, on or about 03/14/2008, in Utah County, Utah, did knowingly 
receive compensation for introducing others into a pyramid scheme. 
COUNT 2: PYRAMID SCHEMES, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-4, 
in that the above named defendant, on or about 09/26/2008, in Utah County, Utah, did knowingly 
receive compensation for introducing others into a pyramid scheme. 
This Information is based on evidence provided by Richard Hales, Utah County Attorney Investigations. 
UTftfi COUNTY ATTORNEY DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Kfoyl0,2010 MARIANE O'BRYANT 
MAY 1 1 W 
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FILED IN 
4™ DISTRICT CO'J 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF U;AM 
2ffl! H#20^P ij 
STATE OF UTAH, 
V S , 
PLAINTIFF, 
DAVID Q. POULSEN, 
DEFENDANT. 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
PLEA 
CASE 101401180 
APPEAL 20110292 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on May 11, 2010. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
(From Electronic Recording) 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
ORIGINAL 
M 2 3 201! 
50UO^S«CR 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRANSCRIBER 
LIC. 102811-7801 
EMAIL: abbpe@yahoo.com 
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FOR THE STATE: 
FOR DEFENSE: 
A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S 
MARIANE B. O1BRYANT, ESQ. 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
100 EAST CENTER #2100 
PROVO UT 84606 
MARK L. POULSEN, ESQ. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
10885 SO. STATE 
SANDY UT 84070 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(May 11, 2010). 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Number 37, Your Honor? 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. O1BRYANT: If I may approach, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: You may. 
MS. OfBRYANT: We have an amended information. 
Counsel has already been provided a copy. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. You've been given a copy of 
the information. Do you waive a formal reading of the 
charge? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes we do, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: We're here today for an initial 
appearance and we'll go ahead and schedule his waiver 
hearing. Is that what we are here for? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think we're here to plea. 
MS. OfBRYANT: Enter a plea to the amended 
information. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Enter a plea, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Enter a plea today? Okay. Two 
Class B misdemeanors. I see. All right. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes, Your Honor. We— 
THE JUDGE: You've advised your client of his 
rights? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I have. 
PAGE 4 
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THE JUDGE: And he understands the possible 
consequences of his plea, the rights that he's giving up or 
waiving, the possible sentence that could be imposed? Is 
that right, sir? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Do you understand? Have you had an 
adequate opportunity to talk to your lawyer about those 
things? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Are you prepared to waive your rights 
and enter a guilty plea to two Class B misdemeanors today? 
Is that the plea bargain or not? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: That is the plea bargain? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: May I have A factual basis to support 
the pleas? 
MS. 0fBRYANT: Yes, Your Honor. On or about 
about it looks like March 14th of 2008 and September 26th, 
2008 this Individual solicited funds for a pyramid scheme, 
the total amount was a, $168,400. 
THE JUDGE: You've heard what's been stated. 
Are those the essential facts that you're admitting to to 
support the plea? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes they are, Your Honor 
PAGE 5 
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ENTRY OF PLEA 
THE JUDGE: They are. Okay. To the charges as 
contained in Count 1 and Count 2, two Class B misdemeanors, 
operating a pyramid scheme, what are your pleas? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Guilty, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: I'll receive and accept your guilty 
plea and proceed to sentencing at a time that you request. 
Do you want to be sentenced today or not? 
MS. 0"BRYANT: Your Honor, I think we can do 
everything but the restitution today. We've, we've 
stipulated. We're recommending that the court order some 
community service and an appropriate fine for the Class B 
misdemeanor. And we're asking for a hearing in about 30 
days. We're going to try and come up with a stipulation as 
to the exact amount this individual is able to pay. 
THE JUDGE: How much community service are you 
recommending? 
MS. 0'BRYANT: 60 hours. 
THE JUDGE: Is that, is that your understanding? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: That will work, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Anything you'd like to 
say in your own behalf, sir? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: There's something I'd like to 
say on his behalf if you don't mind. 
THE JUDGE: Go ahead. 
PAGE 6 
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MR. MARK POULSEN: This individual is an 
immigrant from Viet Nam. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MARK POULSEN: And a, he, although he's not 
illiterate he's a, very very unsophisticated. He was drawn 
into an investment scheme by his elders quorum president. 
He put all of his assets and life savings into that and a, 
lost it all. He was approached by his, two others about his 
a, his deals and told them about it and it resulted in these 
charges, Your Honor. 
He's an extremely unsophisticated person with no 
criminal background and no history whatsoever. He simply 
got caught up in an, in an investment fraud scheme that he 
was swept away in and again, lost all of his assets as a 
result of it. 
I, I would just urge the court's lenience on his 
behalf. A very, again, a very unsophisticated person for 
whom the law has just reached up and whacked in the side of 
the head. He doesn't quite understand it all but a, we'll 
accept the court's determination on it. 
THE JUDGE: Anything you'd like to say in your own 
behalf, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: If I may. 
THE JUDGE: You may. 
PAGE 7 
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STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT POULSEN 
THE DEFENDANT: For the last 18 months my life 
have been changed dramatically from this event. And I don't 
ask the court to a, to be easy on me. I believe in 
responsibility. As a father of six children I teach them to 
do what is right. And because of this unfortunate, that we 
lost everything we have and we have to start over. At the 
same time I teach my children to stand up for and be 
accountable for the mistake they make. And this unfortunate 
mistake, I went through so much persecute at work and from 
what people read in the paper and a, of all these things. 
But the positive outcome came from it, I learned so much from 
it. I became a better father, better husband. And my eyes 
have opened from this and I'm grateful for that 
opportunity. 
And what I'm only asking you as a judge is that 
my children is everything to me, and that if I can retain 
my license to continue to work and support them and raise 
them and start our life over I will greatly appreciate it. 
And I'm sorry for all of this and if you can be 
understanding. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you, sir. Anything further 
from anyone? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Nothing, Your Honor. 
PAGE 8 
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SENTENCE 
THE JUDGE: All right. It will be the judgment 
and the sentence of the court, Mr. Poulsen, that you serve 
six months in the county jail and pay $1,000 fine. I'll 
suspend the sentence this morning, place you on court'-
probation for 12 months. Keep the court advised where you 
live during that time. Do not the violate the law. 
I'll order you serve 60 hours of community service 
and pay a minimum fine of $555 for both, charges, that will 
include the 85% surcharge. So it will be a $300 fine and a 
255 surcharge is $555. Okay? 
Is there a court security fee on a Class B 
misdemeanor? I don't know, I don't think so. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Do I understand you it's 500 
for both charges? 
THE JUDGE: Total. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Total. 
THE JUDGE: Total. That will include both 
charges. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: One fine both Counts. 
All right. All right. Now we need a time 
certain since you're on court probation, there were no 
probation officer here, when this sentence will be 
completed. So when will he have his 60 hours completed and 
PAGE 9 
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pay the fine? You tell me and I'll more than likely go along 
with it but I expect it completed within that time period. 
Okay? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Your Honor, we still need to set 
the restitution—. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MS. O'BRYANT: — and I think it's going to 
probably take the entire 12 months to get everything taken 
care of. 
THE JUDGE: Should we just set a, do you have a 
number now? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Well, we have the total number of 
restitution. I don't think he has the ability to pay that. 
And that's what we wanted to discuss to see if we could come 
up with a stipulation as to court ordered probation. 
THE JUDGE: We'll probably put the order right 
now. What is the total number? 
MS. O'BRYANT: The total number is $168,400, or— 
THE JUDGE: And you agreed to that, so we don't 
need a hearing on that? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: No, I don't agree that that's 
the proper amount. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: That is the amount that 
various people invested, but he didn't get that or any 
PAGE 10 
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approaching that so a— 
THE JUDGE: Well, then that's not the amount that 
he should pay if that's your position. 
MS. 0'BRYANT: Right. That's, our position is 
not that that is the amount that— 
THE JUDGE: It's not a judgment— 
MS. 0'BRYANT: — he should have to pay. 
THE JUDGE: — against him so. 
MS. 0'BRYANT: That's the total loss. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. O'BRYANT: What we need to discuss is— 
THE JUDGE: How much he owes. 
MS. 0'BRYANT: — what he has the ability to pay. 
I — 
THE JUDGE: Okay. We'll put it 60 days down for 
the state to submit a claim for restitution. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: And if it's not decided within that 
time we'll have a hearing. Okay? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Now, the 60 hours of community service 
and the fine. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Now the fine he can pay within 
a week. 
THE JUDGE: One week? Okay. 
PAGE 11 
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MR. MARK POULSEN: And the community service I 
would say 60 days. Are you okay with 60 days? 60 days, 
months. 
THE JUDGE: That's the order then. Okay. Any 
questions? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you very much, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Good luck. Good luck. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION 
) SS, 
I, Penny C.Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that I received the electronically recorded proceedings in 
the matter of State vs. Paulsen, hearing date May 11, 2010, 
and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full, 
true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded 
and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
1 through 11, inclusive, including where it is indicated that 
the recording was inaudible. 
I further certify that I am not of kin nor otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to this cause of action 
and am not interested in the event thereof. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 5th day of May, 
2011. 
PENNY • C .
 /<SteBOTT, COURT REPORTER/NOTARY 
License (22-102811-7801 
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-12 
&%£)*$& PENNY C ABBOTT {£( ®§|ftYsiN0TARy PUBUC * SM7f of UTAH 
i°\<EEjff/s COMMISSION NO. 575806 
v
*-" ''*
V
 COMM. EXP. 09/24/2012 
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JEFFREY R. BUHMAN #7041 
Utah County Attorney 
Mariane 0'Bryant #5442 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Email: ucadm.Dcourt(a).state.ut.us 
Phone: (801) 851-8026 
Fax:(801)851-8051 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID POULSEN, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S REQUEST FOR 
RESTITUTION 
Case No. 101401180 
Judge Steven Hansen 
Plaintiff, by and through Deputy Utah County Attorney, Mariane O'Bryant, hereby moves 
that the court order restitution in this matter in the total amount of $168,400, $82,000 to Robert 
Clark and $86,400 to Michael Keith. 
This Request is accompanied by the supporting documents. 
STATE OF UTAH 
UT/JrRO'JfiTY 
m b P k- U 5 
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day of June, 2010. 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
By: ^ J U O'/U-
MARIANE O'BRYftNT 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \ffl-" day of 3UU/\$-- 2010,1 sent a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Request for Restitution to Mark L. Poulsen at 10885 South State Street, Sandy, 
Utah 84070. 
^ ^ v l ^ S W J ^ 
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Jeffrey R. Buhman 
Tim Taylor 
E. Kent Sundberg 
Jeff Robinson 
tafjCountp&ttornep 
County Attorney 
Chief Deputy 
Civil Division Chief 
Investigation Chief 
Bureau of Investigations 
Patty Johnston 
Scott R. Finch 
Mark Dell'Ergo 
Richard Hales 
Doug Witney 
Jennifer Nakai 
Chelsea Crawford 
Sergeant 
Sergeant 
Sergeant 
Sergeant 
Investigator 
Paralegal 
Legal Secretary 
100 E Center Street, Suite 3300 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Phone (801) 851-8026 
Fax (801) 851-8070 
May 4, 2010 
Restitution for the Poulsen case 09CA00035 
There are two listed victims in this case. They are Robert Clark from Orem, Utah and Michael 
Keith from Mona, Utah. The following list is the outstanding debt/restitution minus the interest 
payments received during the period of time these individuals were invested in Money & More. 
Victim 
Robert Clark 
Michael Keith 
Total Restitution 
Investment 
$100,000 
$90,000 
Interest received 
$18,000 
$3,600 
Loss for restitution 
$82,000 
$86.400 
$168,400 
The supporting documents are attached for Robert Clark. Michael Keith didn't provide the 
promissory note. 
Further information: Robert Clark gave David Poulsen $50,000 for another investment 
involving a real estate transaction. The $50, 000 involved in this transaction is NOT included in 
the restitution total. 
Sgt. Richard C. Hales 
Utah County Attorney 
Bureau of Investigation 
Provo, Utah 84606 
801-851-8025 
Richh@utah.gov 
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
Date 
PrincQjal Amount: $ /Or,'m ^tTSD 
Interest Rate: %% per annum 
PROMISE TO PAY. ' * yp . 
/0 \ & &lftte<Jc rof . it 'JQOi J> MJ&>^ (hereinafter "Borrower*) promises to pay 
^ o ^ g ^ ^ / ^ n ^ Q f (hereinafeer "Lender**), the priiidpal amount of 
fiae li^cLj Ufg>v-a<J (S fOfifrv* ^togeifaerwifh interest at the rate of . 
v^M^-g (~3 %) per aBMmm on the unpaid p r ^ ^ 
4 /pn p&O Zfz-— .until paid in full one year later unless renewed. 
/ 
PAYMENT. Borrower will pay the principal amount of this loan annuaUy, upon m ^ ^ 
investment, with principal and unpaid accrued interest in its entirely. Borrower's final payment will 
be for aB principal and interest no^ 
baas, that is by applying the ration of the actual days outstanding over a year of 365 days, times the 
annual interest rate, times the out&anding principal balance. Monthly interest payments will be sent 
and postmarked no later than the / c of every month. Borrower will pay Lender at the address shown 
below or such otter place as Leader may designate in writing. Unless otherwise agreed, or required 
by applicable law, payments will be applied first to accrued interest and the remaining amount to 
principal. 
PREPAYMENT. Lender agrees to loan the above-referenced funds to Basnrower for a minimum term 
of one year. As a result, there will be no prepayment of the loan amount 
PJREPATMENT. lender agrees to loan t^ 
of one year. As a result, there willbe no prepayment cf the loan amount ar interest d^ until 
maturity, (If this is the correct option, then we would'need to take out the reference to monthly 
interest payments in PAIMENT clause.) 
LAIE CHARGE. Borrower's payment will be late if Lender Does not receive it within 5 days of the 
dae date. If the payment is late, Borrower will be charged a Late Fee of Fifty Dollars ($50). 
DEFAULT. If Borrower does not pay this Note as agreed, of if Borrower breaches any other 
agreement with Lender, Borrower will be in default 
LENDERS RIGHTS. Upon dd£kult,~af ifLender in good faith deems itself unsecured, Lender may 
declare the entire unpaid principal balance and accanued interest im^ 
Borrower* and Borrower will then pay that amount Upcm default, or iftfais Note is not paid at 
maturity, Lender, at its option, may increase the interest rate on this note 2.000 percentage points. 
The interest rate shall not exceed the maximum rate permitted by applicable law. Leader may pay 
someone else to help collect this Note if Borrower does not pay. Borrower also will pay Lender that: 
amount. This includes, subject to any limits under applicable law, Lender's attorneys' fees and legal 
expenses whether or not there is a lawsuit, including attorneys srnd legal expenses for bankruptcy 
proceedings (including efforts to modify or vacate any automatic stay or injunction), appearances, 
and any anticipated post-judgment collection services. Borrower also will pay any court costs. If 
there is a lawsuit, Borrower and Lender agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts in Utah 
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County, State of Utah. This Note shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. Lender may delay enforcing any of its rights or remedies under this Note 
without losing them. If there is any change in the terms of this Note, and unless otherwise expressly 
stated in writing, it is Lender's intention not to rdease any party who signs mis Note, whelher as 
maker, acranmnodations maker, orendorser. All such parlies waive notice of any renewals, 
extensions, modifications, releases or collateral, and other actions taken by Lender. 
Prior to signing this Note, Borrower and Lender read and Borrower and Lender understood all 
of the provisions of this Note. Borrower and Lender agree to the terms of the Note and 
Borrower and Lender acknowledge receipt of a completed copy of the Note. 
BORROWER Signature 
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Posting Date: 
Sequence #: 
Account #: 
Routing Transit: 
Amount #: 
Check/Serial #: 
Bank#: 
Tran Code: 
IRD: 
ItemType: 
BOFD: 
Cost Center: 
Teller Number: 
2008-03-14 
6610239481 
913447872 
12400154 
$100000.00 
000000001054 
602 
001054 
0 
P 
000000000 
N/A 
N/A 
Teller Seq Number: N/A 
Processing Date: N/A 
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•_,,v [ROBERT L: CLARK 
'&i&365 H 1655 S' •" 801-225-0937 
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S y-rrcy 
! BANKfONE. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 
Salt Lake City, Utah B4101 
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
iO Date 
Principal Amount: $ tfOfflO^SD 
Interest Rate: i£ft_% per annum. 
PROMISEjpPAY. (${B 
• • . J^kmJ BoiAsf u\ rfrt>f>;U f [ IJ C (hereiiiafter "Bonowen promises to pay 
n\ cJrml K. (<* ;4-U of tVlt [{Luy X^+ LLCL (hereinafter"Lender"), Aeprincipal amoiniof 
ftiniL* 4-Lo^sftifi Jotftr? (S ^^ j^ yO ^ )tooetbgru^mtaT^stattberateof 
/^ > t^-L- ^firl4- ( U& %) per amnn on the unpaid principal balance from 
fu?r^r(/' ^ .V , until paid in full one year later unless renewed. 
PAYMENT. Borrower will pay the principal amount of this loan annualiyj upon maturation of the 
investment, with principal and unpaid accrued interest in its entirety. Borrower's final payment will 
be for all principal and interest not yet paid Interest wiU be calculated u n ^ 
basis, tfaatis by applying the ration of the actual days outstanding over a year of 365 days, tiroes the 
annual interest rate, times the outstanding principal balance. Monthly interest payments will be seat 
and postmarked no later than the ; 5 / of every month. Borrower will pay Iiendsr at the address shown 
bckm* or such other place as Lender may designate in writing. Unless otherwise agreed, or required 
by applicable law, payments will be applied first to accrued interest and the remaining amount to 
principal. 
PREPAYMENT. Ixadbr agrees to loan t ^ 
of one year. As a result, there will be no prepayment of the loan &moui&. 
PIU^AYh-fENT. Lender agrees to 
ttfcfncyear.Asaresaihtiherew 
maturity, (ffthis isthe correct option, thenwerwavteiIneealio takeom< thz reference to monthly 
mk^csipa}mi^itsinPAYMEhTcIai£Sc.) 
LAIE CHARGE. Borrower* s paynies&: will be late if Leader Does not receive it within 5 &x$s of die 
due date. If the payment is late, Borrower will be charged aLaleFee of Fifty Dollars ($50). 
DEFAULT. If Borrower does not pay thts Note as agEeed, or if Borrower breaches any ot i^ 
agreement with Leader, Borrower will be in default 
LENDERS RIGHTS. Upon default, oriflxndermgODdfei^ 
dedaore the entee unpaid principal balance and accrued interest immediately due, after notice to 
Borrower, and Borrower will then pay that angxiot Upondefkilt, or iftf^ 
maturity, Lender, at its option, may increase the interest rate on this note 2.CKK) percentage points. 
The interest rate shall not exceed the sr^dsngm ^gie psmfeied by applicable law. Lcseier may pay 
someone else to help collect fins Note if Borrower does not pay. Bosrowe^ also will pay Lender tiwt 
amount This includes, subject to any limits under explicable law, Leaderis attorneys' fees and legal 
expenses whether or not there is a kwsui^ 
I^ DC s^Engs (inchkfing eGb«b to modify or vacate any mBtomatfic ^ ay or hyuactioQ), appearances, 
ami any anticipated post-judgment collection sendees. Borrower a!& 
there is a lawsuit. Borrower and Lender agree to submit to the jurisdiction^ 
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County, Stabe ofUtah. This Note shall be governed by and constrn ed in accordance with the laws cf 
the State ofUtah. 
(ENERAL PROVISIONS. Lender may delay enforcing any of its rights or remedies under thcs Note 
whlK>ul losing them_ If the^ and unless otherwise expressly 
stated in writing, k is Lender* s intention not to release any party who signs this Note; whether as 
maker, accommodations maker, or endorser. All such parties waive notice of any renewals, 
extensions, modifications, releases or collateral, and other actions taken by Lender. 
Prior to signing tbb Note, Borrower and Leader read and Borrower and Lender understood al 
of the proviskMB of tins Note. Borrower and Leader agree to the terms of the Note and 
Borrower and Lender acknowledge rccdfrt rf a completed c*py «T the Note. 
BORROWER Signature 
LENDER Signature 
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Addendum E 
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HUD Hi 
4T» DISTRICT CH 
STATE OF in"A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT y^P" ' 
mi nkho p -A 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ' *-' 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS, 
PLAINTIFF, 
DAVID Q. POULSEN, 
DEFENDANT. 
) RESTITUTION HEARING 
) 
) 
CASE 101401180 
APPEAL 20110292 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on March 29, 2011. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
(From Electronic Recording) 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 2 3 2011 
ORIGINAL
 3omsc< 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRANSCRIBER 
LIC. 102811-7801 
EMAIL: abbpeiyahoo.com 
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FOR THE STATE: 
FOR DEFENSE: 
A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S 
MARIANE B. O1BRYANT, ESQ. 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
100 EAST CENTER #2100 
PROVO UT 84606 
MARK L. POULSEN, ESQ. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
10885 SO. STATE 
SANDY UT 84070 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(March 29, 2011) 
THE JUDGE: Which case are we ready on? 
MS. O1BRYANT: We're ready on David Poulsen, 
Your Honor. "'*"' 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Number 57, David Poulsen. 
We're here for a restitution hearing. 
DISCUSSION BY MS. 0'BRYANT 
MS. O1BRYANT: Your Honor, we have not been able 
to come to a resolution of this case. But we have agreed 
rather than have testimony to, to proffer the information to 
the court. 
The state filed a restitution request on June 15th 
of last year. It should be in the court's file. And that 
restitution request has the numbers that we would proffer to 
the court as being the full restitution that the state would 
request. Does the court have that? 
THE JUDGE: Full and complete restitution? 
Let me see if I can find that. The last pleading I have is 
January 31st. 
MS. 0'BRYANT: Right. And on June, June 15th is 
when we filed our original request for restitution. 
THE JUDGE: Way back. Okay. 
MS. 0'BRYANT: So it's going to be farther in the 
file. 
PAGE 3 
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THE JUDGE: State's request for restitution, total 
of 168,400. 82,000 to Robert Clark and 86,000 to Michael 
Keith. Correct? 
MS. O'BRYANT: That's correct, Your Honor. And 
attached to that are the supporting documents for that. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. OfBRYANT: And I believe that the defense 
would stipulate that those are the numbers that are related 
to this case. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. Let's hear from 
the state, your proffer first and then to defense. Or you've 
already made your proffer s o — 
MS. O1BRYANT: That, that would be our proffer, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: That's your.... Okay. 
Okay. Mr. Poulsen? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. POULSEN 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Your Honor, may I approach? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think to be clear, 
Your Honor, we would stipulate that the, the dollar figures 
that you see there are amounts that victims put into this. 
I, I reiterate that there has to be a nexus 
between the allegations pled to, which is participating in a 
pyramid scheme, and the restitution in this case. And I 
PAGE 4 
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don't believe that that 168 represents a nexus in any way, • 
shape or form to, to the injury— 
THE JUDGE: That's the argument you made to me 
that I denied though, isn't it? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I'm not sure if that's, if 
that's what the basis of your denial was, Your Honor. I'm 
not sure— 
THE JUDGE: That was the basis— 
MR. MARK POULSEN: — if that's what you said. 
THE JUDGE: — of your case though, wasn't it? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: My request was to dismiss the 
hearing. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think the court can still 
have a hearing but still make a decision as to the 
appropriateness of the relationship.between the a... 
We DON'T concede though those victims lost that at 
the hands of this person. There's no facts in the record to 
support that, Your Honor. Any facts would be hearsay to 
that effect. 
We pled very simply to participating in pyramid 
scheme. I asked the court in all earnest that the 
restitution order be tied to only those facts. Otherwise we 
wouldn't have pled to them, Your Honor. 
I would say further, had we known that we were 
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going to be facing $168,000 restitution I would rather take, 
try the case and have the offense, you know, dealt with in a 
full and fair hearing than plead to participating in a 
pyramid scheme and still face a $168,000 payback. 
THE JUDGE: Well, if he had been found guilty you 
would still be faced with the same consequence. They would 
be asking for restitution for this amount. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: They would be, and then, and 
again— 
THE JUDGE: We would be right here today whether 
you pled guilty or found guilty. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: But we'd probably only do it 
to a pyramid scheme, Your Honor. That's different than 
sticking somebody up for 168,000. They are not the same. 
And there's not A nexus between those two, it's very very 
crucial. * 
These people all put their money together into a, 
pyramid scheme with, and Mr. Bosch (phonetic) who has been 
indicted by the state— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. S o — 
MR. MARK POULSEN: They were all victims and lost 
on that together. 
THE JUDGE: I don't mean to cut you off. But I, I 
appreciate that argument. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
PAGE 6 
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THE JUDGE: It's a good one and it has some . 
persuasive weight to it. I just decline to adopt it and 
disagree. 
So we are here today to determine the amount, 
you've stipulated to the amount. If you have something to 
say, you'd like to present to me as to what the amount ought 
to be for the court. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes I do, Your Honor. 
The, the tax statements I have here shows that the 
victim, that the, the victim, the, the defendant in the last 
two years has had an income of $100,000, 99 and 101 I think 
so— 
THE JUDGE: Each year? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Each year. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: That represents a, we're 
proffering, Your Honor, that represents his effort to dig 
out of the financial hole by working two jobs. He is an 
X-ray technician for Intermountain Health and a, and for 
Payson hospital. And he works two jobs. And I think it's 
between 20 and $25 an hour is what that would net out to 
as a wage. Works, you know, more than a, 70, 80 hours a 
week. 
He has six children. One is about to leave to 
college, another is about to leave on a mission, various 
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stages of high school and junior high and elementary. 
He doesn't own a house. And he owns two old 
dilapidated cars. Lives in an apartment and a, is a... 
Again, I would represent to the court that his 
expenses are approximately equivalent to his income. He 
pays tithing and his other charitable contributions. And a, 
that again he, he has a, a very little disposable income at 
the end of, of that. 
He's here in open court, Your Honor, you'd be free 
to ask him questions. This is by proffer and that's what I 
would proffer to you. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: But that a, I think that 
he could realistically do debt service a $10,000 obligation 
over a period of, you know, perhaps three years. And a, 
that that would be, that's reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
We're unable to, as the unusual circumstance of 
being a, a small Class B misdemeanor with a very large a, 
restitution amount in it, theoretically. 
But again, I would ask the court to, to not 
indenture this person for, for years of his life in paying 
back an obligation, which he's already paid, lost $300,000 
himself and a, has done everything in his power to support 
his family and dig out of the hole that he's in. 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. ; : ;.; 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: State's response? 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MS. 0' BRYANT 
MS. 0!BRYANT: If I could have just a moment to, 
to verify the accuracy. 
Your Honor, I don't know if you want this marked as 
an exhibit or if I could simply submit this as part of the 
restitution. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I have no objection. 
MS. O'BRYANT: Okay. If we could have this 
marked. This is from the bankruptcy court. Mr. Poulsen 
filed bankruptcy in 2009. It's marked as state's EXHIBIT #1 
and they have accepted the accuracy of this. 
I would call the court's attention to the average 
expenses incurred, monthly income. There's $1,000 difference 
there in the, positive, which would seem to indicate that even 
after all of.his monthly expenses he could afford $1,000 a 
month payments. 
THE JUDGE: This was dated when? 
MS. OfBRYANT: That's I believe January of 
2009. 
THE JUDGE: What are the circumstances now? 
MS. OfBRYANT: My understanding is the total 
income that he's making is the same or greater than it was at 
PACT: Q 
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that time. 
THE JUDGE: Do you want to respond to this? 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. POULSEN 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes. My only response, 
Your Honor, would be that the circumstances of a, of raising 
a family and paying, the children going to college and those 
circumstances have, have evaporated whatever additional 
income might be represented by that, or so-called disposable 
income. Just the needs of a growing family, Your Honor, are 
overwhelming in that sense. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So let's make sure that 
you're both a, representing to me the standard of review for 
the court here today. You both stipulate and agree that the 
real purpose of the hearing is to determine not the amount of 
restitution, that's been fixed and is full and complete at 
the 168,400. Right? But the order should be based on his 
ability to pay. Correct? 
MS. O1BRYANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Do you agree with that? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I do agree with that. 
THE JUDGE: And what you've presented to me is 
the only evidence that I have before me to determine his 
ability to pay. Correct? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes. As well as 
appropriateness. If I could state for the record, as well 
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as the appropriateness of the payment in the nexus to the 
crime is, I believe, a proper standard for the court to 
follow. 
THE JUDGE: I'm not quite sure. You keep arguing 
that to me and lym not sure I understand it. Because that 
was before me before and I, I think I denied that, that 
argument that you have made that there should be a 
restitution that, no restitution in this case because it's 
not appropriate to the crime that he committed. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: And the only thing again I 
would like to say for the record on that point, it's 
appropriate to have a restitution hearing where both the 
amount of the restitution, or both the ability to pay as 
well as the circumstances of the restitution are 
appropriate. I think that that is within the scope of a 
restitution hearing. 
THE JUDGE: Ms. Baldwin do you have, 0'Bryant, do 
you have anything to respond to that? 
MS. OfBRYANT: Your Honor, I think the court has 
ruled on whether restitution is appropriate in the case. 
It's just simply the amount that needs to be addressed here 
today 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. Okay. 
Well, I have considered that he's working two jobs 
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and is an X-ray technician, he makes $25 an hour. He has six 
children. He lives in an apartment. He has no home. He 
drives old cars. 
That he has had income in the past two years of 
99,000 and $100,000 each year which is substantial income. 
I do appreciate and find that he has little disposable income 
but that there was a bankruptcy where he was verifying to the 
bankruptcy court he had $1,000 a month disposable income back 
in January of 2009. 
I appreciate that his expenses have gone up with 
college and other things towards his family. But 
restitution is an important component in this, in this case. 
And a, some of the other luxuries of, of college educations 
and things like that for his children, as important as that 
is, and I don't mean to diminish that, it seems to me to be 
a, something that he has the ability to forego, and that the 
victims in this case should be paid before that takes place. 
And there's an, obviously that seems to me to be an extra 
income for him. 
So I think that a restitution order in this case 
from 168 ought to be a, 60,000, 30,000 to each victim, and 
that he has the ability to pay $1,000 a month, 500 to each of 
those victims for five years until that's paid in full. 
Okay? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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THE JUDGE: Anything further? That's the' ' ':' 
parameters of what you presented to me. 
Is that right, Ms. 0'Bryant? 
MS. 0fBRYANT: It is correct, Your Honor. 
-v— THE JUDGE: Mr. Poulsen? Anything else that I'm 
missing here that that's what you wanted me to determine 
based on the law and the facts that I have before me? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: The defendant was saying he 
can't work two jobs for five more years, he just doesn't 
think he has the physical capacity for that. 
THE JUDGE: Well he's, he's got a, he's got tax 
returns and income of $100,000 a year. And so I do not see 
in any way, shape or form that I have a poverty case before 
me here. And something is going to have to change in his 
life-style to make sure that he maybe cuts back on a few 
things and that this restitution is paid. 
If his income was less than that, counsel, I'd be 
more sympathetic with your case. But that's a substantial 
income in this economy, many people are making far less than 
that. So that was the most persuasive piece of evidence in 
favor of the state in my view and justified the, especially 
in light of the fact that his bankruptcy listed he had 
$6,000 a month and $5,000 a month in expenses. 
If he has disposable income he wants to place for 
his children's college, that's great. But there are other 
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ways to do that, student loans, and children can work. 
These victims need to be paid. I have reduced it 
substantially from what was ordered in this case, what was 
presented to me I should say in this case, based on his 
ability today. But clearly with the facts before me today 
he has that excess income, that income to pay this amount and 
for this period of time to these victims. 
Thank you. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION 
) 
) SS, 
) 
I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that I received the electronically recorded proceedings in 
the matter of State.vs. Poulsen, hearing date March 29, 2011, 
and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full, 
true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded 
and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
1 through 14, inclusive, including where it is indicated that 
the recording was inaudible. 
I further certify that I am not of kin nor otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to this cause of action 
and am not interested in the event thereof. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 5th day of May, 
2011. 
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License/l£-102811-7801 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
. STATE OF UI AH 
MTAHC0UN1 1 
RESTITUTION HEARING 
SENTENCE, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID Q POULSEN, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
JUDGMENT, COMMI TME&T 
21i miW A b-ZJvv Case No; 
Judge: 
Date: 
101401180 
STEVEN L. 
March 29, 
FS 
HANSEN 
2011 
PRESENT 
Clerk: taras 
Prosecutor: OBRYANT, MARIANE B . 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): POULSEN, MARK L 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 16, 1969 
Audio 
Tape Number: 11-2 03 Tape Count: 10:47 
CHARGES 
1. PYRAMID SCHEME 
Plea: Guilty 
2. PYRAMID SCHEME 
Plea: Guilty 
HEARING 
• Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 05/11/2010 Guilty 
• Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 05/11/2010 Guilty 
TAPE: 11-203 COUNT: 10:47 
This matter comes before the court for a restitution'hearing. 
Mrs. 0'Bryant proffers testimony. Mr. Poulsen proffers testimony. 
Mr. Poulsen stipulates to the dollar;;amounts the victims have 
invested. Mrs. OfBryant responds. The court orders restitution in 
the amount of $60,000.00. 
The court orders $30,000.00 to be paid to Robert Clark and 
$30,000.00 to be paid to Michael Keith. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant!s conviction of PYRAMID SCHEME-a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
The total time suspended'for this charge is 180 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PYRAMID SCHEME a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
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Case No: 101401180 Date: Mar 29, 2011 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $10 00.00 
Due: $0.00 
Charge # 2 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $10 00.00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Fine: $2000.00 
Total Suspended: $2000.00 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$0 
$0 
Plus Interest 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 60 hour(s) of community service. 
Restitution Amount: $30000.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: ROBERT CLARK 
Restitution Amount:.$30000.00 
Pay in behalf of: MICHAEL KEITH 
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY 
The following cases are on timepay 101401180. 
The defendant is to pay $1000.00 monthly on the 29th. 
The number of payments scheduled is 63 plus a final payment of 
$748.75. 
The first payment is due on 4/29/2011 the final payment of $748.75 
is due on 07/29/2016. The final payment m ^ vary based on 
interest 
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